PM IAS OCT 25 EDITORIAL

1. India’s Central Asian outreachAfghanistan’s situation has thrown up challenges for New Delhi


Context: The dramatic developments in Afghanistan have catalysed new geostrategic and geoeconomic concerns for the region. This has thrown up renewed challenges for India’s regional and bilateral ties with Central Asia and the Caucasus, prompting India to recalibrate its rules of engagement with the region.

  • External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar was in the region earlier this month — his third within a span of four months.

Recent Developments:

  • In Kyrgyzstan, India extended a credit line of $200 million for the support of development projects and signed an memorandum of understanding (MoU) on High-Impact Community Development Projects (HICDP).
  • In Kazakhstan capital, Nur Sultan, Jaishankar attended the 6th Foreign Ministers’ Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), where –
    • He targeted China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), admonishing China’s methods in promoting the BRI.
    • While he said, greater connectivity was essential for the promotion of regional stability, it must not be pursued for parochial interests.
  1. He also confronted Pakistan for its support towards cross-border terrorism.
  2. Mr. Jaishankar met his counterparts from RussiaUzbekistan and Turkmenistan to discuss regional cooperation.

India-Armenia ties: Mr. Jaishankar has become the first Indian External Affairs Minister to visit Armenia. Agreements include –

  • Both countries to enhance trade and cultural exchanges to boost bilateral relations.
  • India supported efforts for a peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Minsk group.

Impact of Taliban’s takeover in Central Asia:

  •  
  • Failure of SCO: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which was created in response to the threats of terrorism that sprang from Afghanistan, has instead been used by most member countries for their own regional geostrategic and security interests. There is an increasing the trust-deficit and divergence within the forum as the SCO failed to collectively respond to the Afghan crisis which met in Turkmenistan in August.
  • Afghanistan is ethnically diverse: Its population holds Tajiks, Uzbeks, Pamiri and several other hill tribes of the central Asia. Thus these regions have emotional connect with the situation in Afghanistan.

About Central Asia: It is a group of 5 countries: Kazakhstan, UzbekistanTurkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan; Sandwiched between Caspian Sea and China; and Between Russia in the north, an Iran-Afghanistan in the south.

Indian interests in Central Asia

  • Energy security: Hydrocarbons(example TAPI (Turkmenistan  Afghanistan Pakistan India) pipeline), Uranium in Uzbekistan and Kazakhistan.
  • Connectivity: International North South Transport Corridor(INSTC); Reduced cost of transit to Russia.
  • Strategic: Route to Europe, Important in Stabilizing Afghanistan.
  • Economic: Trade; Creating returns for Chabahar.
  • Diplomatic: Countering China: Giving these countries an option to counterbalance China
  •  
  • Security: RATS in SCO, Prabal Dostyk with Kazakhistan.

Engagement after cold war:

  • Reset ties after breakup of the Soviet Union: It had led to the formation of the independent republics in Central Asia.
  • Financial aid: India provided financial aid to the region and established diplomatic relations.
  • Strategic Partnership Agreements (SPA) Model of engagement: New Delhi signed the SPAs with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to stimulate defence cooperation and deepen trade relations.
  • ‘Connect Central Asia’: In 2012, New Delhi’s ‘Connect Central Asia’ policy aimed at furthering India’s political, economic, historical and cultural connections with the region.
  • Summit level meet: Soon after assuming office, Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited all the Central Asian countries in July 2015. Eventually, Central Asia became the link that placed Eurasia in New Delhi’s zone of interest.
  • Investment centred around Chabahar project: India signed MoUs with Iran in 2015 to develop the Chabahar port in the Sistan-Baluchistan province that was in the doldrums from 2003.

Challenges:

  • Connectivity: India’s efforts are stonewalled by Pakistan’s lack of willingness to allow India passage through its territory.
  • BRI: China took advantage of the situation and unveiled the much-hyped BRI in Kazakhstan.The growing geostrategic and security concerns regarding the BRI’s China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and its violation of India’s sovereignty.

Opportunities and Way forward:

  • Willingness of Central Asian countries: They have been keen to have India as a partner as they have sought to diversify their strategic ties, being in influence of China and Russia.  Most of the Central Asian leaders view India’s Chabahar port as an opportunity to diversify their export markets and control China’s ambitions.
  • Connectivity: They have admitted New Delhi into the Ashgabat Agreement, allowing India access to connectivity networks to facilitate trade and commercial interactions with both Central Asia and Eurasia, and also access the natural resources of the region.
  • Rising anti-Chinese sentiments within the region and security threats from the Taliban allow New Delhi and Central Asia to reimagine their engagement. India cannot afford to lose any time in recalibrating its regional engagements.

Expected Question:  India’s strategic interests in the central Asian region and their need for diversification makes India and central Asia a natural partners. Comment. (250 words)

 

COP26 must focus sharply on reducing emissions till 2030, rather than on net zero 2050, which is too distant a goal

GS 3: Environment

Context: The 26th UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26) in Glasgow, starting October 31.

Two major issues are abuzz before the meet:

  1. Net zero emissions by 2050 i.e., greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions equalling absorption by sinks such as forests, even though the substance is much less than the slogan suggests.
  2. Carbon Pricing: an instrument that captures the external costs of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This is levied on the Carbon emitters and is used as a relief against the loss occurred due to Climate Change. It is based on Polluter Pays principle.

Net zero mirage:  Why 2030 NDC targets are more important than Net Zero 2050 targets

  • The AR6 report: the Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) emphasised that to keep temperature rise within 1.5°C, global emissions should be reduced by 45% from 2010 levels by 2030, on the way to net zero 2050.
  • Agreed principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR): a foundational principle of UNFCCC. Developed countries, responsible for over 75% of accumulated atmospheric GHGs causing climate change, should shoulder most of the burden for reducing emissions. So, if the goal is global net zero emissions by 2050, CBDR would imply that developed countries should reach net zero by, say, 2035-40, while developing countries can get there later.
  • It takes away focus from NDCs: Net zero 2050, as currently posed, is at best a distracting message and at worst deliberately diverts attention away from the urgent 2030 target that COP26 should focus on. 
  • 2030 targets critical: One hundred and thirteen parties out of 194 submitted updated NDCs by end-July 2021. The UN NDC report tells us that even accounting for these, global emissions in 2030 are expected to be 16.3% above the 2010 level, whereas the IPCC has called for 2030 emissions to be 45% less from 2010 levels for the 1.5°C goal. The report therefore calls for “a significant increase in the level of ambition of NDCs” till 2030.
  • For the sake of least developed countries: Pressure will undoubtedly come from Africa, Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Small Island States and others.
  • For the sake of earlier commitments under UNFCCC: It was suggested some years ago that the COP ensures that Parties iteratively raise their commitments till they add up to the requisite 45% reduction by 2030. This is hardly focussed upon currently.

Major Global violators today:

  • US’s gross violation: The U.S. has now promised net zero emissions by 2050 compared to the 80% reduction that it had promised earlier. The Biden administration has also promised to reduce emissions by 50–52% below 2005 levels by 2030. This is grossly insufficient as the U.S. is the world’s second largest emitter. Further,  the 2005 baseline is considerably lower than those of the EU, the U.K. and others using the Kyoto 1990 baseline.
  • Brazil under Jair Bolsonaro ravaging the Amazon forests, and
  • China, the world’s largest emitter, which is relentlessly pushing towards more emissions to add maximum infrastructure, industrial and power-generation capacities before peaking in 2030. This may use up much of the cumulative global emissions available for 1.5°C.

Challenges for India:

  • Needs for India: India emits 7% of global emissions, has extremely low per-capita emissions that are far below the global average and yet ranks as the world’s third largest emitter.
  • Delay in finalizing commitments: India has not yet submitted its updated NDC as required and may face difficulties at Glasgow, especially from LDCs and most vulnerable countries feeling existentially threatened even as powerful nations wheel and deal.
  • Poor performance: The well-known website Climate Tracker has now placed India in its second- worst performing category of countries regarding conformity with global 1.5°C goals, down from the top category for 2°C just after the Paris Agreement.

Way forward for India:

  • Raising targets further: India can, without much difficulty, raise its NDC pledge of reducing Emissions Intensity (ratio of emissions to GDP) by 33-35% from 2005 levels by 2030 to 38-40%. This is quite achievable since India has been averaging around 2% p.a. reduction in EI as per its own NDC.
  • Net Zero Offer: India could also offer to achieve that by 2070-75, invoking CBDR and comparing well with China’s 2060 pledge.
  • Targets for Peaking emission: If pressed on a peaking year, a 2040-45 guesstimate may not be far off the mark, especially if increasing forest and tree cover are stepped up instead of undermined.
  • Installing renewable energy: For India to convert its ambitions of installing 450GW of renewable power by 2030, adding green hydrogen or increasing electric vehicles into commitments may require more homework than done so far.

Certain Positives:

  • Greater contribution of EU & UK: Several large emitters have announced deeper emission cuts than in the Paris Agreement. The U.K. and the European Union have raised their targets to a significant 68% and 55%, respectively, compared with 1990 levels by 2030.

Carbon Budget Strategy:

  • More scientific strategy: as highlighted in AR6 and AR5.
  • Carbon budgets represent the quantum of CO2 the atmosphere can hold for a given global temperature, best assessed through cumulative emissions and not annual flows.
  • AR5 & AR6’s assessment: The report of updated NDCs states that “the cumulative CO2 emissions in 2020–2030 based on the latest NDCs would likely use up 89% of the remaining carbon budget, leaving a post-2030 carbon budget of around 55 Gt CO2, which is equivalent to the average annual CO2 emissions in 2020–2030.”

Conclusion: COP26 must focus sharply on reducing emissions till 2030, rather than on net zero 2050, which is too distant and with possibilities of gaming the system. If COP26 does not focus on achieving the 45% emission cuts from 2010 levels required by 2030 for limiting temperature rise to 1.5°C, and continues with geopolitics as usual, then the world may well have squandered away one of its last chances to avert disastrous climate impacts.

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