PM IAS EDITORIAL SEP 03

Editorial 1:Dealings at a China-Africa forum that India must track

Context

The stance of African leaders at the FOCAC meet in Beijing could guide India in developing its own partnership with the continent.

Introduction

The ninth edition of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) is to take place from September 4-6, 2024, in Beijing. The event comes at a time when African nations are facing multiple issues such as high inflation, currency depreciation, a heavy debt burden, unconstitutional military takeovers and geopolitical challenges such as the Israel-Hamas and Russia-Ukraine wars, and attacks by Houthi rebels on commercial shipping in the Mediterranean Sea.

About FOCAC

African Leaders and Summit fatigue : Have cropped up post multiple recent Africa+1 summits with Türkiye, Russia, South Korea, and the U.S.-Africa Leaders’ Summit. Rather than having 54 leaders attend, following the Banjul format of 15 countries plus the African Union Commission (AUC) is more prudent. 

Africa’s Role in the FOCAC Process: The utility of the FOCAC process for Africa is increasingly contingent upon Africa’s ability to set the agenda and take greater ownership of its strategic thinking.

Knowledge Asymmetry alongside its Consequences: Due to the lack of African state capacities, expertise, and the political will to understand how China and the Communist Party of China (CCP) work.

Gap in expertise: African governments have been unable to tap the vast amount of cultural and linguistic expertise of China that exists on the continent, which results in the agenda being driven by the Chinese side and African negotiators being on the back foot.

What are the key African priorities at FOCAC 2024?

  • The economic front: Progress on Beijing’s $300 billion import goal from Africa for 2022-24 has been slow. From January to July 2024, China-Africa trade reached $167 billion, with $97 billion in Chinese exports and $69 billion in African exports. Roughly two-thirds of this trade involves raw materials.
  • The industrial development: Developing a sustainable and robust agricultural industry is an imperative. In Africa, the task of processing agricultural commodities and even doing basic processing at home such as roasting raw cashew nuts remain a challenge.
  • Key expectations w.r.t farming: Countries like China and India, with experience in small-scale farming, could help develop crops, fertilizers, and pesticides tailored to African conditions. Their expertise and tools can enhance African agriculture’s climate resilience, including through improved weather forecasting using satellite systems.
  • Green energy and industrial development: African countries are urging international partners to set up more refining and processing hubs. In Zimbabwe, Chinese companies are required to conduct basic lithium refining locally to advance to battery-grade production.
  • Power concerns in African region: However, chronic electricity shortages, lack of power generation, and significant environmental, social and governance (ESG) costs hamper the ability of international companies to refine raw minerals in African countries.

China and African debt

  • China’s role in African debt sustainability: Data from the Boston University Global Development Policy Center shows that Chinese loans to African governments and institutions totalled about $170 billion from 2000 to 2022. Despite this, China is not the primary creditor, holding 12% of Africa’s public and private debt. While the idea of Chinese ‘debt trap diplomacy’ is debated, certain Chinese lending practices warrant closer scrutiny.
  • Concerns in debt structuring: A 2022 AidData study revealed that half of Chinese loans to sub-Saharan Africa are not included in sovereign debt records, complicating debt assessments. Despite concerns about opacity and non-disclosure, China is unlikely to offer debt forgiveness or cancellation, preferring to write off small, interest-free loans
  • Past experiences with Chinese debts: In previous instances, ad hoc and poorly structured engagements from the African side at FOCAC meetings pushed the continent into a reactive stance rather than driving the agenda.
  • Develop a coherent strategy towards China by Africa: To harmonise African positions before the FOCAC summit, African countries will continue to de-emphasise aid, focus on trade facilitation, and aggressively pursue product value addition. 

Indian engagement in Africa

  • Indian model and way of doing business: India is not influenced by the actions of any third country. India has its own comparative advantages in sectors such as ICT, human resource development, agriculture and pharmaceuticals. However, India must learn from the way African leaders negotiate with their Chinese counterparts under FOCAC.
  • Need for continuity in its engagement with Africa: The last India–Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) was in 2015. Dialogues such as the CII-EXIM Bank Conclave, and India Africa Defence Ministers meeting have been held regularly. But if India wants to capitalise on the momentum following the inclusion of the African Union (AU) in the G-20 under the Indian presidency, it must hold the IAFS-IV at the earliest.
  • Deliberate on mutual interests: Meanwhile, an India-African Union Track 1.5 Dialogue could be set up to deliberate on issues of mutual interest. This must be done after due consultation with Africa’s eight recognised regional economic communities (RECs).
  • African efforts needed: The host of IAFS-IV should be Addis Ababa, Ethiopia which is the seat of the African Union Commission. Additionally, the AU should look to establish a regional office in New Delhi to strengthen regular consultations. 
  • India could play a central role: in strengthening the integration of African economies into global value chains and supporting Africa’s industrialisation.
  • Indian companies must look for higher value-added investments in sectors such as agriculture, pharmaceuticals, and manufacturing.
  • The idea is to set up manufacturing bases in African countries that will help to create employment and serve local markets.
  • Indian companies working in Africa should look to invest in farm mechanisation, food processing, irrigation, establish cold storage infrastructure to prevent food wastage, and continue to promote the use of ‘Triple A’ (affordable, appropriate and adaptable) technologies. 
  • Encouraging greater Indian private sector participation Subsequently, innovative ways of financing such as public-private partnerships, and blended finance are the way forward.
  • Finding innovative financing solutions: While India’s lines of credit remain a popular instrument for financing projects, African countries are apprehensive about taking newer loans after the COVID-19 pandemic.
  • Clubbing Indian strategic and business interests in Africa: With government support for Indian banks and entrepreneurs through low-cost credit, Indian firms can conduct feasibility studies and develop bankable projects. Additional financing options, like the EXIM Bank’s Trade Assistance Programme, could build trust and strengthen banking ties between India and Africa.
  • Technology use : India’s own digital stack, which includes biometrics, mobile connectivity and Jan Dhan technology, could help establish digital and physical connectivity with Africa.
  • Digital payment boost: The Unified Payment Interface (UPI) and RuPay services are already established in Mauritius. Kenya, Namibia, Ghana and Mozambique have shown interest in utilising the UPI platform.
  • Strengthen Indian banking and reduce forex risk: Rupee-based lines of credit must replace dollar-based ones. African nations lose billions of dollars annually in exchange rates. Therefore, making transactions that are currency-neutral is in the interest of both India and Africa. 

Conclusion

African countries are increasingly taking greater ownership of their strategic thinking. Their citizens are demanding accountability from their governments to ensure that their economies move up the value chains. They are trying to change the narrative surrounding Africa by repositioning the continent as an investment destination. By gauging how African leaders engage and negotiate with China under FOCAC provides important lessons for bolstering India’s own partnership in Africa. Indo-African relationship can be boosted further towards regions continued stability.


Editorial 2: ​The Disaster Management (Amendment) Bill is knotty

Context

The Bill only strengthens the top-down approach, affecting vital cooperative federalism in disaster management

Introduction

On August 1, 2024, the central government introduced the Disaster Management (Amendment) Bill in the Lok Sabha. Brought in in the wake of climate-induced disasters, the Bill shows much evidence of a further centralisation of an already heavily-centralised Disaster Management Act, 2005. This Act, in its current form, already mandates the creation of many authorities and committees at the national, State and district levels.

Key details about the Bill

  • Complicated chain of Action: The proposed Bill further provides statutory status to pre-act organisations such as the National Crisis Management Committee and a High Level Committee, leading to confusion in case of disasters.
  • Repercussion of this top-down approach is seen when there is a delayed response to disasters, antithetical to the intent and purpose of the Act. 
  • Giving planning powers: Strengthen the working of the National Disaster Management Authority and the State Disaster Management Authorities to prepare State and national level plans.
  • Creation of Authorities: It also establishes an ‘Urban Disaster Management Authority’ for State capitals and cities with municipal corporations.

Centralisation as a concern 

The intended decentralisation of functions without the necessary financial devolution creates more problems than it solves:

  • Hazy wordings in the Bill: The amendment Bill goes on to dilute the wording of the National Disaster Response Fund by removing the purposes for which the fund shall be used.
  • Centralising tendencies: One of the major concerns of the Disaster Management Act has been the excess centralisation of decision making on funds, especially in situations where the disaster is severe.
  • Absence of disaster severity coding: The severity of the disaster must necessitate a prompt response by the central government, currently absent in the Act.
  • Denial of Funds: Delayed response was witnessed when the disaster relief funds from the NDRF were denied to Tamil Nadu and disbursed much later to Karnataka. 
  • Core concern: In the backdrop of a looming climate crisis, there is a need to revisit the very idea of disasters under the Disaster Management Act, 2005
  • Restricted definition of ‘disaster’ : the government is currently not planning to classify heatwaves as a notified disaster under the Disaster Management Act, 2005.
  • Need for expanding the scope of notified disasters: The notified list of disasters eligible for assistance under the National Disaster Response Fund/State Disaster Response Fund are cyclone, drought, earthquake, fire, flood, tsunami, hailstorm, landslide, avalanche, cloud burst, pest attack, frost and cold wave. 
  • The Heatwave scenario: Heatwaves are widely recognized as climate-related disasters due to their severe impact on ecosystems and human health. India experienced a record 536 heatwave days over nearly 14 years, with 10,635 deaths from heat or sunstroke between 2013 and 2022, signalling an impending larger disaster for the country.
  • Concerns with inclusion of heatwave as a disaster: The Disaster Management Act, 2005, and the proposed Bill are inadequate because their static definition of disasters limits the inclusion of climate-induced events like heatwaves, which vary regionally and are specific to certain areas.
  • Classification of Heatwaves: A normal summer temperature of 40° C in several north Indian States may classify as heatwave conditions in the Himalayas.
  • Concerns with definition of Heatwave in Act: It also fails to recognize a prolonged heatwave as a natural disaster, despite its impacts on human life being comparable to those of actual disasters like floods.
  • Conflict with old definition of disaster: This creates a problem because climate-induced disasters do not fit the traditional disaster concept defined by the Disaster Management Act, 2005, and the proposed Bill. The issue is worsened by the localized nature and impact of such climate-related events.

Conclusion

If the Bill claims to be an improvised version of the Disaster Management Act, 2005, it does very little in learning from the failures encountered during the implementation of the Act while dealing with past disasters. There is a need to re-visit the Centre’s efforts in addressing the issue of financial preparedness when it comes to the management of and response to disasters. The conversation should not revolve around whether the Centre or State is responsible for the loss of lives in Wayanad, Kerala, but what is it that can be done to manage disasters and predict their future occurrence. After all, a blame game will only move away from realising the true spirit of cooperative federalism. Thus, centre and State should work in a synergistic manner as disaster related events will rise with global climate change and hence will require more coordinated efforts.

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