Editorial 1:India’s place in Russia-Ukraine peace-making

Context

There are indications that New Delhi is engaging with all parties and developing its role as an interlocutor but there are the ‘ifs, ands, or buts’.

Introduction

Two years after the Government of India held that “Europe’s problems are not the world’s problems” to distance New Delhi from the theatre of the Russia-Ukraine war, speculation about its determination to help resolve the war has gained traction. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visits to Moscow and Kyiv, a possible meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the United Nations next week and with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the BRICS Summit next month, as well as the travels of National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar all point in this direction. 

India’s engagement with the parties

• With the United States: The fact that Mr. Modi “briefed” United States President Joseph Biden in a phone call after the Ukraine visit.
• With the Russia: Mr. Doval told Mr. Putin that he had been tasked to “brief” him about the visit as well when he met him in St. Petersburg last week indicate that India is engaging with all parties and developing its role as an interlocutor. 

India’s role, the full picture

The India’s advantages and reason for playing such a role are many —

• Holistic engagement with all the parties: It is one of the few countries that is engaging both sides of the geopolitical schism over Ukraine, i.e., the West as well as the Eurasian leadership.

• India’s belief system sprouting from the past policies: India’s long-held beliefs on non-alignment and strategic autonomy, which the Modi government has largely carried forward during the war with its abstention votes at the UN and refusal to accept western sanctions, help its image as an “honest broker” or mediator. 
• Global positioning of India: India is an important voice for the Global South and it succeeded in ensuring its G-20 presidency focused on war outcomes such as energy and food security that matter to the developing world rather than the war itself.
• India’s economic engagement: As a result, the increase in India’s intake of Russian oil, leading to a six-fold increase in bilateral trade, has been projected as an assertion of its principles rather than profiteering. 
• Building a global legacy: PM Modi would try, much like India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was able to do by mediating between the USSR and Austria for the withdrawal of Soviet troops in exchange for a policy of neutrality, or by India leading international efforts and UN commissions on wars in Korea, Vietnam and Cambodia. 
• The complete assessment of the situation: Beginning with a study of the state of war in Ukraine. Russian troops remain entrenched in about a sixth of territory of the country for more than two years now, while Ukrainian forces are successfully holding the line outside of these areas.
  • This indicates that any change in the status quo could come only from a massive escalation in the war. Mr. Zelenskyy’s move to occupy Russian territory in Kursk was a novel tactic, but was perhaps only meant to be used as a bargaining chip or “leverage” as the Ukrainian President put it, in future negotiations.
• Ukrainian leaders New York next week: Mr. Zelenskyy will be seeking a further escalation: western permissions for the long-range Storm Shadow missiles, and Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACM) for airstrikes deep inside Russia, which he believes is receiving lethal weaponry from Iran and North Korea.
• Putin’s Ultimatum: Mr. Putin has said in no uncertain terms that if the West clears the request, it would be a declaration of direct war between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Russia.
• United States Political dynamics: An alternative outcome could also arise from the U.S. elections on November 5 — a win for former U.S. President Donald Trump may mean the U.S. curtails its expenditure in support of Ukraine, seen positively by Mr. Putin, and more sobering for Ukraine and Europe, while a win for U.S. Vice-President Kamala Harris will indicate continuity in the U.S.’s support. 

An offering that would have to stand out

• The New Delhi need of its own proposal: for conflict resolution or de-escalation taking into account that there are already a number of proposals in the arena, all of which have been rejected by one side or the other.
• Rejections by the War parties: Mr. Putin and Mr. Zelenskyy have rejected each other’s proposals, that involve giving up territory on the ground.
  • Mr. Putin rejected the Bürgenstock Communiqué, that India also disassociated from, which dwelt on the issues of nuclear safety, humanitarian access and the exchange of prisoners. 
  • Mr. Zelenskyy recently rejected the six-point Brazil-China joint proposal that proposed the same measures towards a path of “de-escalation”.

• Potential mediators for the solution to end war: China has, in the past year successfully brokered agreements between Iran and Saudi Arabia and Hamas and Fatah.
  • Hungary too, a country with access to both sides, made a ceasefire proposal which has been rejected by Ukraine. 
• Summing up India’s position in Berlin last week: Mr. Jaishankar listed a four-point principle:
  • This is not the era of war
  • there are no solutions on the battlefield
  • Russia must be at the table for talks
  • India is concerned and engaged to find a resolution to the conflict

While these principles are incontrovertible, they are by no means a concrete proposal, and India will need to work on a more comprehensive vision of its path to peace. 

• Studying what India’s role would be: During their conversation, Mr. Zelenskyy told Mr. Modi that India is simply too large and important a country to seek a role as “messenger” between Moscow and Kyiv.
  • In any case, recent rounds of prisoner exchanges between the two countries make it amply clear that there are enough channels to relay information between them. 
• Importance of India’s larger role using various platform: : India serving as a mediator or even the host for a summit between the two sides, although given India’s recusal from the Swiss Peace Summit outcome, may be a task left to one of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries that have been a part of the process thus far.
• Ensuring a soft power approach: Whatever the decision, this is an exercise that will require India to use its heft, diplomatic goodwill and other resources apart from intensified travel by officials, Ministers and the Prime Minister focused on discussing solutions to the Russia-Ukraine war. 

Way Forward: Consistency would be the key word

• Balancing India’s internal conflict: At a time when the government is dealing with internal conflicts including Manipur, revving up the economy through international engagement, regional turbulence and a host of other important issues, it could justifiably question the need to spend its resources on this conflict.
• Balancing the external conflicts: Externally, when civilian casualties from Israel’s bombardment of Gaza or from the civil war in Sudan are far more than those estimated to be non-military casualties in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
  • The question over which conflict India chooses to intervene in poses a challenge.
  • In addition, India will be judged on the consistency of its message- if “dialogue and diplomacy” are indeed the “only way forward”, then it is difficult to account for the Modi government’s refusal to consider an opening with Pakistan.

Conclusion

Ultimately,  balance of the pull and push factors will decide how far New Delhi will go as a peace-maker in the war that has consumed Europe and the U.S. for more than 30 months. As a country of considerable consequence in the world, one that straddles the West and the east, the Global North and South, and as the only country that is member of both the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, United States) and BRICS, India is uniquely positioned. The critical element is the timing of its foray into a field that has, thus far, only seen failure. As Abba Eban wisely noted, “History shows that people and nations act wisely only after all other options have been exhausted.” India’s growing role as a mediator in the Russia-Ukraine conflict also reflects its strategic engagement and its diplomatic efforts. However, it must also craft a more concrete proposal so that it can make a meaningful impact.

---

Editorial 2: Wrong notion

Context

As objected by states as anti-federal on the central approval of the idea of simultaneous elections.

Introduction

Notwithstanding the opposition from political parties and many in civil society to the idea of simultaneous elections, the Union government has decided to accept the recommendations of a high-level committee headed by former President Ram Nath Kovind to go ahead with the scheme.

Key proposals by the Ram Nath Kovind Committee

• The committees view and proposal:  The committee envisaged simultaneous Lok Sabha and State Assembly elections as the first step.
• Elections of local and state government: Then it would be followed by municipal and panchayat polls within 100 days of the general election.
• Amendments in the constitution: The government would need to get constitutional amendments to be passed, in Parliament and in the State Assemblies.

Reasons for the proposals

Two key reasons have been evinced for the proposal —

• The reduction in the expenditure: Firstly, the costs of conducting these elections would be significantly reduced if held together.
• The impact on Governance: Pausing the never ending election mode in Indian political setup as not having simultaneous elections has kept political parties in prolonged campaign mode, impacting governance and legislative work.

Concerns of states with the report on the simultaneous elections

• Lack of justified empirical data: There has been little to no empirical data to support the first reason.
• Extending of the election period: Already, general elections take an inordinately long time, with some State polls being held in phases. Simultaneous elections could prolong this process.
• The prime issues of the mid-term elections: One of the committee’s recommendations is that if a State Assembly gets dissolved before five years of its term, after the “appointed date” —
  • Concern with the reduction in the tenure: the date for synchronising Lok Sabha and Assembly elections — fresh “midterm” elections will be held but the new Assembly’s will not have a full five-year tenure. Its tenure will end five years from the “appointed date”.
  • Reversing the agenda of one election: This provision militates against the original idea of cost cutting through simultaneous elections. It is also an anti-federal idea.

Key implications on a multi-tiered governance system

•  
• Key role of each tier in a democracy: Each tier has its exclusive importance and so does the related election.
  • Representative democracy and selection of candidates: people choose their representatives based on their perception of who is best suited.
  • Importance of multi-tiers in a democracy: The power being demarcated for different levels of government allows for distinct roles for each representative and suggests varied voter choices that could be based on party affiliation, candidate strength, ideological positions or socio-economic reasons that are constituency-specific.
  • Perennial campaigning mode is not problematic:  that representatives are in perennial campaign mode and, therefore, polls to every tier should all be held during the same period, is problematic.
• Over centralisation: That national representatives of parties are forever in campaign mode is a consequence of the centralising tendencies of parties that are in power today and is not a reflection of the extant electoral democratic system.
• Negative impact on federalism: Subsuming multi-tier elections into simultaneous mode has the potential to reduce the importance of each tier, especially the Assembly and municipal/panchayat levels, and is anti-federal.
• Reducing the tenure: Lastly, to effect this proposal, the tenures of quite a few State governments will have to be cut short.

Way forward

In simultaneous elections, the Union government should take two steps, firstly it needs to prepare empirical research about the costs and impacts on governance, and secondly it should deal with constitutional amendments, evaluating the transition’s effects on federalism, while avoiding hurdles to federal governance structure. Working alongside key stakeholders and magnifying alternatives to longer electoral campaigns will ensure greater confidence between stakeholders.

Conclusion

Parties and civil society actors committed to federalism may squarely reject this proposal by the Union government if mutual dialogue, discussion and debates are not conducted. Therefore, centre needs to roll out pilot programs which will be necessary to understand viability. Clear communications to the public and feedback on their issues will ensure an informed choice. To conclude, a phased deployment with pilot programs would allow one to gain insights and develop a more managerial implementation and stakeholder acceptance. Thus, greater transparency and open communication can help address and ease fears, fostering more open-minded decision-making.