PM IAS EDITORIAL ANALYSIS JUNE 09

Editorial 1: ​Consultative regulation-making that should go further

Context

The RBI and SEBI have started the process, but Parliament should think about making a law with clear and standard steps for creating regulations.

Introduction

In May this year, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) shared a clear policy on how it will release regulations, directions, guidelines, and notifications. This came after a similar step by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) in February, when it published rules explaining how it will create and issue regulations.

Strengthening Transparency and Accountability in Regulation-Making

  • Regulators like the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and SEBI are created by Acts of Parliament and have quasi-legislative powers.
  • Because of this, it is important to have strong procedural safeguards and checks and balances to protect the rule of law.
  • Recently, both RBI and SEBI introduced frameworks that explain the steps they must follow when making laws, which is a good first step.
  • When proposing new rules or changes, the RBI will now carry out impact analyses, and SEBI will clearly state the regulatory intent and objectives.
  • Both regulators will also invite public comments for 21 days.
  • Additionally, they will periodically review their own regulations.
  • These reforms show a positive move towards more transparent and consultative rule-making.
  • However, more can be done to strengthen these processes.
  • Two important improvements are needed:
    1. Regulators should clearly explain the economic reasons behind their decisions.
    2. They should set up ways to ensure accountability for regular reviews and for responding to public feedback.

The issue of market failure

  • RBI and SEBI must base their new rules on a clear economic rationale—they should identify what problem or market failure the rule is trying to fix.
  • The Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission (FSLRC) in 2013 said that laws should be defined by their economic purpose, not just procedural goals.
  • Many other countries follow strong regulatory practices that India can learn from.
  • Current gaps:
    • RBI talks about “impact analysis” based on “economic environments”,
    • SEBI explains its objectives,
    • But neither is required to clearly state the economic reason or market failure behind a proposed regulation.
  • In contrast, the IFSCA framework demands a clear statement of the issue being addressed.

International Best Practices vs Indian Frameworks

Country / AuthorityRegulatory Practice
United StatesMust perform cost-benefit analysis, ensure least burden on society, and assess alternatives.
European UnionUnder Better Regulation Framework: must define problem, suggest solutions, and explain evaluation methods.
IFSCA (India)Must state the issue the regulation seeks to address.
RBI (India)Requires impact analysis but doesn’t mandate explanation of economic rationale.
SEBI (India)Must state objectives, but not necessarily the underlying market failure.

What Financial Regulators in India Should Do

  • Identify the market failure or core issue needing regulation.
  • Explain how the proposed regulation will solve the problem.
  • Conduct cost-benefit analysis to show how the rule will help or hurt.
  • Create a monitoring plan to track how well the rule works after implementation.

Improving Transparency and Accountability in Consultative Regulation-Making

Current Challenges

  • The track record of Indian regulators like the RBI and SEBI in consultative rule-making has been poor.
  • A study (June 2014–July 2015) found that:
    • The RBI sought public comments on only 2.4% of its circulars.
    • SEBI invited public input on less than half of its regulations.
  • This shows that stakeholders have had very few chances to give feedback on new regulations.
  • There is hope that things will improve, but regulators need to become more transparent about their consultation processes.

Suggested Transparency Measures (Reported Annually)

To improve accountability, regulators should publish the following:

  • Total number of public consultations vs. total number of regulations or amendments.
  • Number of responses received.
  • Details of suggestions accepted and rejected.
  • Reasons for accepting or rejecting each suggestion.
  • The impact of public feedback on the final version of the regulation.
  • All associated timelines (e.g., when consultations began and ended).
  • SEBI sometimes includes such data in board meeting agendas, but often removes public comment summaries citing confidentiality.

Importance of Regular Reviews

  • Both RBI and SEBI should clearly mention how often they will review their regulations.
  • This is important in light of the government’s commitment to deregulation and ensuring that rules remain relevant.
  • In contrast, the IFSCA has a strong rule: it must review each regulation every three years.

Recommended Review Practice for Indian Regulators

RegulatorCurrent PracticeSuggested Improvement
RBINo fixed review intervalDefine clear timelines for regular review
SEBINo regular scheduleSet review frequency, tied to goals of each regulation
IFSCAReview every 3 yearsAlready follows best practice
  • Suggestion: At pre-defined and frequent intervals, regulators must assess:
    • Whether the regulations are working as intended,
    • And whether they are still needed or need updating.
    • This will make Indian financial regulation more responsiveevidence-based, and public-friendly.

Conclusion

Good regulatory practice requires a clear and strong reason for any new rules. The RBI and SEBI have started working in this direction. However, a major challenge is the limited capacity of the government to carry out regulatory impact assessments and hold consultations. Also, small changes made by individual regulators may not be enough to keep good regulatory standards everywhere. The Parliament could think about passing a law like the Administrative Procedure Act in the United States, which sets standard procedures for making rules. This law would include steps like impact analysispublic consultation, and regular review. Countries like the United Kingdom and Canada have already created such guidelines for rule-making by government agencies. Adopting a similar system in India would make all regulators more transparent and accountable.

Editorial 2: Judicial sensitivity to sentiments is a sign of regression

Context

The judiciary in India is hurting free speech by trying to control what people say.                              

Introduction

Today, Indian courts are not protecting free speech—they are controlling it. This goes against the true spirit of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, which sees free speech—even if it is provocative or uncomfortable—as a citizen’s protection against misuse of power, not something to be feared or restricted.

Judiciary and Free Speech: A Shift in Role

  • The judiciary, once seen as a protector against majoritarian power, now often acts like a guardian of politeness, asking for apologies in the name of civilitynational pride, or sensitivity.
  • When courts focus only on what was said, rather than why the right to say it matters, they weaken free speechand make the country vulnerable to emotional outrage and public pressure.
  • 24-year-old man posted on social media, criticizing Prime Minister Modi after the May 2025 ceasefire with Pakistan following Operation Sindoor.
    • Was the post in bad taste? Maybe. But “taste” is not a constitutional rule.
    • The Allahabad High Court denied the plea to cancel the FIR, stating that “emotions cannot overflow to a point where national leaders are brought into disrepute“.
  • This reasoning reverses the core idea of our Constitution:
    • The citizen is meant to hold the state accountable,
    • Not be treated like a child punished for speaking too freely.
  • The shift from protecting rights to managing feelings risks turning free speech into a privilege, not a right.

Judicial Shifts in Interpreting Free Speech under Article 19(1)(a)

  • Traditional Interpretation: Article 19(1)(a) was meant to safeguard individual liberty by limiting state powerover speech.
  • Recent Trend: Courts now seem to treat this right as a conditional licence, where speech is evaluated through behavioural standards, often not codified in law.
  • These conditions are increasingly defined by perceived dignitynational sentiment, or public outrage, rather than legal thresholds like incitement or defamation.

Case Studies Reflecting this Shift

CaseNature of ExpressionJudicial ResponseKey Concern
Kamal Haasan & “Thug Life” remarkReferred to Kannada as the “daughter of Tamil”Karnataka HC advised apology to public sentimentsNot about legality but appeasing perceived offence
Ranveer Allahbadia Podcast CaseUse of explicit/vulgar languageCourt sought Centre’s stance on whether such speech is protectedFocused on taste/modesty, not incitement
Prof. Ali Khan MahmudabadCritique of India’s war-time media opticsJudicial proceedings initiated over “hurt sentiments”Academic critique subjected to dog whistle investigations

Dangerous Precedents Being Set

  • Courts asking for apologies for lawful speech:
    • Legitimises mob outrage or majoritarian sentiment as a valid legal standard.
    • Undermines the principle of constitutional protection from popular disapproval.
  • Subjective thresholds like offencetaste, or sentiment:
    • Replace clear legal standards with emotional benchmarks.
    • Allow anyone claiming offence to trigger judicial action.

Wider Implications

  • Judicial endorsement of cultural policing:
    • Encourages self-censorship.
    • Turns courts into arbiters of social decorum instead of protectors of freedom.
  • Expression judged by acceptability rather than legality:
    • Violates the core idea that free speech exists precisely to protect unpopular views.
  • Hurt sentiments now a legal threshold:
    • Courts risk transforming into forums that validate fragility rather than uphold liberty.

A misreading

1. Emotional Reaction ≠ Legal Harm

  • Emerging Pattern: Courts are equating emotional distress or offence with legally actionable harm.
  • Constitutional Misreading:
    • Article 19(2) permits restrictions only on specific groundspublic order, decency, morality, defamation, incitement to an offence, etc.
    • Mere anger or offence is not a valid ground for restriction.
  • Democratic Risk: Democracies thrive on disagreement and dissent. Judicial policing of emotional triggers weakens constitutional protections.

2. Outrage as a Litigation Strategy

  • Judicial encouragement of apologies or moral policing:
    • Sets up a dangerous incentive structure: more outrage → more litigation.
  • Effect:
    • Emboldens mobs, trolls, and serial litigants.
    • Chilling effect on speech: fear of being dragged into legal battles deters critical commentary.

Illustrative Case Examples

CaseIssueJudicial ResponseConcern
Rahul Gandhi – Army DefamationAlleged derogatory remark about ArmyAllahabad HC: Free speech does not include “defaming” ArmyRisk of shielding public institutions from democratic critique
‘Coward’ comment on PMSarcastic criticism post military stand-downFIR allowed under BNS Sections 152 & 353(2)Satire treated as sedition-like offence
Trend of Denying FIR QuashingCalls for early-stage dismissalCourts decline, allowing full police processProcess becomes punishmenteven without conviction
Madras HC ExceptionsSometimes resists overreachProvides narrative correction, not structural safeguardLacks consistent speech-protective jurisprudence

Judicial Overreach and Its Structural Flaws

  • Apologies become judicially coerced, not voluntary acts
  • Courts resemble confessional booths:
    • Speech is judged by remorse, not reason.
    • Demanded remorse devalues the act of genuine apology.
  • Summons, FIRs, investigations:
    • Create psychological and legal pressure.
    • Even without conviction, the threat of prosecution chills dissent.

Reaffirming Principle-Centric Free Speech

Current TrendRequired Corrective
Policing offence and decorumReassert constitutional boundaries for restriction (Art. 19(2))
Encouraging litigation over outrageDiscourage mob-triggered legal actions
Allowing FIRs for sarcasm/satireDemand stricter scrutiny for criminalising political expression
Coerced apologiesReinforce apology as a personal and non-legal act

The signal to the citizen

  • Vague laws like sedition and shifting public order clauses must be interpreted with a bias toward liberty.
  • The “chilling effect” doctrine, though acknowledged in Indian courts, is rarely applied with institutional courage.
  • The issue is not limited to celebrities; it affects everyday citizens:
    • YouTubers are told to bleep jokes.
    • Professors are dragged to court for tweets.
    • Filmmakers are forced to apologise for cultural or linguistic pride.
  • This sends a clear signal to society: say only what is safe, agreeable, and bland.
  • But true democracy thrives on disagreement—even when it’s noisy, rude, or provocative.
  • A society’s democratic maturity is tested not by how it tolerates politeness, but by how it withstands provocation.
  • Free speech is not just about the right to give offence, but also about the responsibility to endure it.
  • To preserve its democratic essence, India must restore respect for dissent and stop prioritising institutional dignity over individual liberty.

Conclusion

Judges are guardians of the Constitution, not enforcers of cultural comfort. Their role is to protect free speech, not soothe listeners. When courts chill speech in the name of sentimentfreedom quietly erodes. This growing sensitivity confuses harmony with uniformity and respect with restraintApologies should never be a legal requirement, nor should speech need validation to be legitimate. India’s Republic was born from protest, not politeness. As Dr. B.R. Ambedkar said, the world owes much to those who dared to challenge authority. Our judiciary must defend the right to speak—especially when it is unpopular.     

Comments

No comments yet. Why don’t you start the discussion?

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *