Nov – 21 Editorial Analysis – PM IAS

Constitutional Federalism: SC Clarifies Governor’s Power Over State Bills

Syllabus

• GS-2: Functions and responsibilities of the Union and the States, issues and challenges pertaining to the federal structure, devolution of powers and finances up to local levels and challenges therein. Appointment to various Constitutional posts, powers, functions and responsibilities of various Constitutional Bodies.

Context

On November 21, 2025, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India delivered a landmark judgment clarifying the limits of a Governor’s power regarding assent to Bills passed by state legislatures under Article 200 and Article 201 of the Constitution. The editorial dissects the verdict, which was triggered by prolonged inaction on state Bills, emphasizing the delicate balance required for cooperative federalism versus the potential for constitutional subversion.

1. The Core Constitutional Conflict: Articles 200 & 201

The editorial begins by framing the conflict as a systemic flaw arising from the ambiguity of the phrase “as soon as possible” in Article 200. This phrase governs the timeframe within which the Governor must act on a Bill.

• Article 200 (Governor’s Assent): The Governor has three options when a Bill is presented:
  • Grant Assent: The Bill becomes law.
  • Withhold Assent: Return the Bill for reconsideration by the legislature (unless it is a Money Bill). If the legislature passes it again (with or without amendments), the Governor must then assent or reserve it for the President.
  • Reserve the Bill for the President: Mandatory for Bills that endanger the position of the High Court, and discretionary for Bills that impinge upon Union List subjects.
• Article 201 (President’s Consideration): Deals with Bills reserved for the President’s consideration, who also has the power to assent, withhold assent, or return the Bill to the state legislature (via the Governor).
• The Issue of Constitutional Subversion: The real problem, as highlighted by the editorial, is the practice of Governors effectively vetoing Bills by indefinite inaction—a fourth option not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. This undermines the legislative will of an elected government and violates the spirit of a parliamentary democracy.

2. The Supreme Court’s Clarification and Limits of Intervention

The judgement attempted to resolve the impasse while respecting the separation of powers.

A. Prohibition of Indefinite Delay (A Win for Federalism)

• The SC unequivocally ruled that a Governor cannot sit indefinitely on a Bill. Prolonged, unexplained inaction constitutes a failure of constitutional duty and is justiciable.
• The editorial strongly supports this, noting that it reinforces the principle that the Governor, while possessing independent discretion under Article 200, is fundamentally an integral part of the state’s legislative process, not an obstructionist check.
• The Court affirmed that the Council of Ministers (CoM) decision to re-pass a Bill is paramount, placing a constitutional compulsion on the Governor to act (assent or reserve for the President) thereafter.

B. Rejection of ‘Deemed Assent’ and Judicial Timelines (A Respect for Separation of Powers)

• The SC rejected the novel doctrine of “deemed assent” previously established in a two-judge Bench ruling (which had declared 10 Tamil Nadu Bills as having received deemed assent due to the Governor’s delay).
• Rationale: The Court held that a Bill cannot become law without the formal, physical act of assent by the Governor or the President, as stipulated by the Constitution. Using Article 142 (the SC’s special power to do complete justice) to create deemed assent would be tantamount to the judiciary legislating or substituting the Governor’s/President’s constitutional role, which is impermissible.
• The Court also declined to impose fixed, rigid timelines for the Governor’s decision, arguing that the Constitution’s use of “as soon as possible” grants flexibility necessary for due consideration and that the imposition of judicial deadlines would violate the sanctity of the constitutional office.
• The editorial argues that while rejecting fixed timelines is legally sound, the court’s failure to prescribe any concrete timeframe leaves the ambiguity intact and relies solely on the good faith of the constitutional office holder, which has historically proven unreliable.

3. Discretion vs. Ministerial Advice: The Role of Discretion

The editorial notes the SC’s clarification on the nature of the Governor’s discretion under Article 200.

• Governor’s Discretion: The Governor is not bound by the advice of the Council of Ministers when deciding whether to assent, return the Bill, or reserve it for the President the first time. This function is an exercise of independent constitutional discretion.
• Limits of Discretion: However, this discretion is not absolute. It must be exercised judiciously and promptly. Prolonged inaction falls outside the scope of bona fide discretion.
• Post-Reconsideration Mandate: If the legislature re-passes the Bill, the Governor’s discretion is severely limited. They must either assent or reserve for the President; they cannot return it again. The editorial views this as the crucial check against legislative frustration.

4. Broader Implications for Federalism and Governance

• The Problem of the ‘Agent’: The core issue remains the Governor’s dual role—as a constitutional head of state and as a representative of the Union government. The editorial points out that delays are often politically motivated by the Centre to stall legislation in opposition-ruled states, thus disrupting the federal equilibrium.
• Need for Constitutional Convention: The verdict underscores the urgency of developing a strong constitutional convention that mandates Governors to act within a reasonable time, preferably within three to six months, as recommended by the Sarkaria and Punchhi Commissions.
• Article 361 Immunity: The Court clarified that Article 361 (personal immunity of the Governor) cannot be used to justify institutional inaction. The individual Governor is protected, but the institutional failure to perform a duty is still subject to judicial review.

5. Way Forward and Conclusion

The editorial concludes that the Supreme Court’s verdict is a mixed bag. It successfully addresses the abuse of indefinite inaction but fails to provide a structural solution to the problem of delay.

• Need for Legislative/Executive Action: The Union government should issue clear guidelines or seek a Presidential reference on the interpretation of “as soon as possible” to settle the ambiguity once and for all.
• Strengthening Article 131: The Court must also clarify the role of Article 131 (Original Jurisdiction of SC on Centre-State disputes) as an avenue for states to challenge the Centre-directed inaction of the Governor.
• Judicial Overreach Avoided: By refusing to create “deemed assent” or fixed timelines, the Court maintained the crucial distinction between judicial interpretation and judicial legislation, upholding the separation of powers despite the constitutional frustration.

The judgement is a cautionary reminder to Governors that their office is bound by the mandate of the elected legislature, and while they possess veto power, they do not possess the power of indefinite silence.

2.Public Health and Equity: Decoding the National Strategy for Rare Diseases

Syllabus

• GS-2: Issues relating to development and management of Social Sector/Services relating to Health. Welfare schemes for vulnerable sections of the population.
• GS-3: Science and Technology—developments and their applications and effects in everyday life. Biotechnology.

Context

An editorial on November 21, 2025, focused on the need to refine and properly fund the National Policy for Rare Diseases (NPRD), following a specific appeal made by parents of children suffering from Spinal Muscular Atrophy (SMA)—a condition for which life-saving gene therapies exist but are prohibitively expensive. The editorial argues that for a policy to be truly national and equitable, it must move beyond general declarations and establish clear, sustainable mechanisms for funding, diagnosis, and indigenous research.

1. The Challenge of Rarity and Cost

The editorial first highlights the fundamental challenge of rare diseases in India.

• Definition and Burden: Rare diseases are conditions that affect a small percentage of the population, often defined as affecting fewer than 1 in 2,000 people. While individually rare, their collective impact is significant, affecting an estimated 70 million Indians.
• Diagnostic Odyssey: Up to 80% of rare diseases have a genetic origin. Patients often endure a “diagnostic odyssey” lasting years due to a lack of awareness, centralized registries, and specialized diagnostic labs.
• Prohibitive Cost of Treatment: The treatments, particularly Orphan Drugs (developed specifically for rare diseases), cost astronomical sums (e.g., crores of rupees per patient per year), making them inaccessible to all but the wealthiest families. This cost creates a severe ethical dilemma for the state regarding the allocation of limited public funds.

2. Analysis of the National Policy for Rare Diseases (NPRD)

The editorial evaluates the existing framework provided by the NPRD.

• Three-Tier Approach: The NPRD attempts to address the problem through three broad categories:
  • Group 1: Disorders amenable to one-time curative treatment (e.g., organ transplants).
  • Group 2: Diseases requiring long-term treatment with high costs (e.g., Lysosomal Storage Disorders).
  • Group 3: Conditions for which definitive treatment is available but where patients can be managed with supportive care.
• The Funding Gap (The Fatal Flaw): The policy’s major failure is the lack of a sustainable, large-scale funding mechanism. While it provides a one-time grant of up to ₹50 lakh for Category 1 diseases, this is grossly insufficient for chronic, ongoing treatment (Category 2) or for the high initial cost of revolutionary therapies like those for SMA.
• Crowdfunding Reliance: The editorial sharply criticizes the policy for placing a high reliance on crowdfunding platforms for patients needing lifelong or ultra-expensive therapy. This shifts the state’s responsibility to private charity, violating the constitutional guarantee of the Right to Health (Article 21).

3. The Need for Indigenous Research and Development

A key suggestion from the editorial is to radically shift focus toward domestic, affordable solutions.

• Orphan Drug Act: The editorial proposes that India enact its own version of the US Orphan Drug Act, offering incentives (tax breaks, patent exclusivity, fast-track approvals) to domestic pharmaceutical and biotech companies.
• CSIR and ICMR Mandate: Central research bodies like the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) must receive targeted funding to develop affordable Biosimilars and indigenous gene therapies (like the development of BIRSA 101 for Sickle Cell Anaemia) for common Indian rare diseases.
• Data and Registry: It is essential to establish a centralized National Rare Disease Registry to track patient data, prevalence, and treatment outcomes. This data is critical for researchers to target specific genetic mutations prevalent in the Indian population.

4. Ethical and Administrative Dimensions

The rare disease challenge is also an ethical and administrative one, which the editorial tackles.

• Prioritization Dilemma: The state faces a moral hazard: should limited public funds be spent on a single patient’s crores-worth treatment, or allocated to preventive healthcare that benefits millions? The editorial advocates for a balanced approach, where a specific, ring-fenced fund is created to address high-cost therapies without cannibalizing the general health budget.
• Transparency and Distribution: The administration of the existing funds is often opaque and slow, leading to delays that can be fatal for children with progressive rare diseases. The editorial calls for a single, transparent, online window for application and fund disbursement, potentially managed by a National Rare Disease Authority.
• Global Collaboration: India must leverage its global diplomatic standing to negotiate directly with multinational pharmaceutical companies for tiered pricing or licensing agreements for life-saving gene therapies.

5. Way Forward: Recommendations for a Robust Strategy

To truly fulfill the promise of equitable healthcare, the editorial suggests the following steps:

• Creation of a ‘Sovereign Rare Disease Fund’: Establish a permanent, large corpus fund, potentially subsidized by a small cess or tax on non-essential healthcare products, that is dedicated solely to financing rare disease treatments.
• Mandatory Newborn Screening: Implement phased mandatory national newborn screening for a panel of common, treatable rare diseases. Early diagnosis dramatically improves treatment outcomes and lowers long-term costs.
• Capacity Building: Train and certify Rare Disease Centres of Excellence (CoEs) in every region, ensuring equitable geographical access to diagnosis and specialized medical advice.
• Strengthening Public Health Insurance: Integrate high-cost rare disease management into flagship schemes like Ayushman Bharat, making the government the primary payer and thereby leveraging its bargaining power to reduce drug prices.

Conclusion

The editorial concludes that the ethical and public health mandate to treat rare diseases cannot be dismissed due to cost. The state must move from a posture of “benign neglect” to one of “active commitment.” The National Policy for Rare Diseases has laid the groundwork, but only a robust, well-funded, and research-focused strategy can bridge the massive gap between the availability of modern medicine and the access for India’s most vulnerable citizens.