Editorial 1: Not revenge or retaliation, but a paradigm shift
Context
Converting the Line of Control into an International Border remains a practical solution to end Pakistan’s ongoing proxy war against India.
Introduction
The Pahalgam terror attack on April 22 has pushed Delhi and Islamabad onto a new strategic path, demanding the attention of the entire security community. As the deadliest civilian attack since Mumbai 2008, its brutality — including religious profiling and executions — aims to terrorise Indians, destabilise Kashmir’s economy, and fuel communal tensions nationwide. Unlike past “fidayeen” missions, this assault was precise, with a planned exfiltration. While a full probe is pending, India has responded with diplomatic steps like suspending the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) and authorising the military to plan a response operation.
A response that is not just revenge
Strategic Goal
Craft a long-term response to terror attacks that:
- Goes beyond revenge or retaliation
- Acts as a short-term deterrent
- Alters cross-border patterns and behaviour in the long run
Step 1: Study Past Indian Responses
To design an effective strategy, evaluate which past responses best served India’s national security.
| Year/Event | Response Type | Key Outcomes |
| 2001 (Parliament Attack) | Operation Parakram: Full-scale military mobilisation | Demonstrated resolve, but lacked long-term strategic effect |
| 2007 (Samjhauta Express Attack) | Sought joint investigation with Pakistan | Diplomatic initiative with limited tangible results |
| 2008 (Mumbai Attacks) | Global diplomatic campaign to isolate Pakistan | Resulted in FATF grey-listing; forced Pakistan’s public acknowledgment |
| 2016 (Pathankot Attack) | Invited Pakistani investigators to airbase | Controversial move; yielded little outcome |
| 2016 (Uri Attack) | Cross-LoC surgical strikes on terror camps in PoK | Tactical success; changed engagement rules |
| 2019 (Pulwama Attack) | Balakot airstrikes beyond PoK; IAF pilot captured | Created escalation risks; tested air superiority and international optics |
Step 2: Evaluate the Pahalgam Attack Context
- Seen as a deliberate provocation, unlike earlier attacks
- Likely pre-planned exfiltration, not a “fidayeen” attack
- Aims to:
- Terrorise civilians
- Disrupt Kashmir’s economic recovery
- Incite communal tensions across India
Step 3: Required Response Strategies
Indian planners must move beyond past templates. Three distinct yet coordinated strategies are required:
- Counter-Terror Strategy
- Enhance intelligence penetration
- Target infrastructure and networks facilitating cross-border terrorism
- Strengthen internal coordination
- Retaliatory Strategy
- Execute precision and asymmetric operations
- Maintain element of surprise
- Consider economic, cyber, and covert options
- Counter-Counter Strategy
- Anticipate Pakistan’s retaliation spectrum
- Prepare diplomatic, military, and narrative management responses
- Build international support and redundancy
Step 4: Watch for 3 Strategic Wild Cards
1. Pakistan’s Military Leadership – Gen. Asim Munir
- Advocates escalatory doctrines, referencing:
- A “hard state” framework
- Revival of the “two-nation theory“
- Kashmir as the “jugular vein“
- Background and motivations:
- Commissioned during Zia-ul-Haq’s radical phase (1986)
- Promotes the ideology of “Jihad fi Sabeelillah”
- Under pressure to avenge the Jaffar Express attack (March 2025)
- Faces internal pressure due to Imran Khan’s lingering popularity
- Will remain powerful until at least 2027 under amended Pakistani law
2. China’s Role
- Must factor in China’s response if India’s action impacts:
- The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)
- Broader China-Pakistan strategic alignment
3. Indian Political Pressure
- Increasing calls in India for:
- A “decisive war”
- “Cartographic changes” through territorial capture in PoK
- Risks:
- Overreaction could lead to strategic miscalculations
- Might close diplomatic space and invite international scrutiny
The diplomatic road ahead
| Focus Area | Key Points |
| Global Pressure to De-escalate | India must resist pressure from US, UK, EU, UAE, Saudi Arabia calling for restraint. |
| IWT Suspension Fallout | World Bank, China, and Bangladesh may oppose India’s move to suspend IWT. |
| UNSC Challenges | Recent UNSC statement was diluted, omitting TRF and India’s authority, due to Pakistan’s role. |
| Targeting TRF Diplomatically | Push for UNSC and US listings of TRF as a terrorist group, as with LeT and JeM. |
| Revive FATF & CCIT Strategy | Use FATF pressure again; relaunch CCIT proposal on global terror. |
| Engage Opposition Diplomatically | Deploy Opposition & J&K leaders abroad, like Indira Gandhi (1971) and Narasimha Rao (1994). |
LoC as the border
- Time to reconsider the idea of turning the LoC into a formal border, a proposal abandoned two decades ago.
- Pakistan’s military has exploited the LoC’s permeability and temporary status to conduct proxy warfare.
- The LoC serves as a route for recruiting, training, and infiltrating terrorists into India.
- The TRF claimed the Pahalgam attack was meant to resist “demographic changes” in Jammu & Kashmir.
- On its side, Pakistan has already altered demographics in PoK by settling non-Kashmiris and army personnel.
- Gilgit-Baltistan has been integrated federally, making it difficult for India to govern, even if taken by force.
Conclusion
It is, therefore, essential to declare the end of Rawalpindi’s ‘jugular vein’ theory and its aspirations of reuniting the now fragmented regions of Jammu and Kashmir or annexing the Kashmir Valley. New Delhi must reconsider the 2007 LoC agreement proposals, which aimed to transform the Line of Control (LoC) or ceasefire line into a de-facto border, eventually leading to its recognition as a permanent International Border. The international community’s role, if any, would be to ensure that Pakistan commits to this arrangement — if it seeks to promote a lasting equilibrium in the region.
Editorial 2: India must rethink its Arctic outlook
Context
The growing militarization of the Arctic calls for a fresh perspective from New Delhi.
Introduction
As conflict zones multiply globally, another frontier is quietly slipping into turmoil — the Arctic. Long seen as a realm of scientific cooperation and environmental protection, the polar north is becoming a theatre of military and geopolitical competition. With Russia more assertive, China expanding its Arctic ambitions, and Washington renewing interest in Greenland, the region appears set for a renewed phase of strategic contestation. The Arctic’s shift to the center of global power competition is driven by climate change, which has opened new maritime routes like the Northern Sea Route (NSR). Once limited to summer, it is now a year-round passage, increasing traffic and reshaping global trade.
A growing militarisation
| Aspect | Explanation |
| Militarisation of the Arctic | The Arctic is becoming more militarised with states reopening military bases, deploying submarines, and asserting control through force, raising the stakes for influence in the region. |
| Historical Context | The militarisation trend is not new. Actions like Donald Trump’s 2019 proposal to buy Greenlandshowed the Arctic’s growing geopolitical importance. |
| India’s Response | India remains insulated from the shifting Arctic realities, focusing on other regional challenges. Its 2022 Arctic Policy emphasizes climate science and sustainable development, drawing parallels with the Himalayan “Third Pole”. |
| Policy Limitations | India’s policy overlooks the Arctic’s evolving strategic landscape. Its restrained approach risks sidelining it in the emerging Arctic order. |
| India’s Arctic Presence | India operates a research station in Svalbard, contributes to polar expeditions, and has observer statusin the Arctic Council, but these efforts were designed for a more cooperative environment now disrupted by geopolitics. |
A constructive role for India
- NSR Viability: As the Northern Sea Route (NSR) becomes more viable, trade flows could shift north, undermining the importance of Indian Ocean sea lanes.
- Arctic Sea Routes: If Russia and China dominate Arctic sea routes, India’s connectivity hub aspirations in the Indo-Pacific (through SAGAR and IPOI) could face significant challenges.
- Blurring Boundaries: Growing Russia-China cooperation in the Arctic and China’s naval presence in the Indian Ocean complicate India’s focus on its southern maritime interests.
- Nordic Concerns: Increasing unease among Nordic states over India’s ties with Russia, especially amid the Ukraine war, adds pressure.
- India’s Arctic Diplomacy: India needs to reassure its Arctic partners that an approach based on strategic autonomy can benefit all sides.
A more purposeful engagement
- Institutionalisation: India must expand Arctic engagement beyond science with dedicated desks in the Foreignand Defence Ministries, regular inter-agency consultations, and partnerships with strategic think tanks.
- Partnerships: Collaborate with like-minded Arctic states on dual-use initiatives such as polar logistics, maritime domain awareness, and satellite monitoring, boosting credibility without provoking concerns.
- Governance & Diplomacy: Claim a seat at emerging Arctic governance forums focused on infrastructure, shipping regulation, digital standards, and the blue economy. Engage in the region with sensitivity, respecting local communities and avoiding an extractive mindset.
Conclusion
India’s current Arctic posture has merit, but it is no longer sufficient. It relies on the belief that scientific cooperation and climate diplomacy can bridge growing geopolitical fault lines, a hope that is quickly fading. The Arctic is now defined more by power than principle. Those unwilling to adapt may find themselves excluded from the emerging order.
